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I. INTRODUCTION 
Promoting Internet freedom and resisting legal or 
technological forms of control has long been a cause célèbre among 
lawyers and cyberlaw scholars.1  On the one hand, the Internet and 
its related technologies, it was thought, may hold “limitless” 
potential for new forms of individualism, self-determination, and 
“social progress.”2  On the other hand, it may also spur new 
technologies of control, censorship, and surveillance, where 
freedom and privacy are threatened.3  In one future there is great 
liberty; in another, a great threat to it. 
Yet, the running assumption in both of these scenarios is that 
people, for good or ill, will be connected to the Internet, and in 
increasing numbers.  Is this a sound premise today?  Does not fast 
 
 1. Early “cyber-libertarian” writers like John Perry Barlow argued that 
“cyberspace” was beyond the control and reach of both governments and industry.  
See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-
Final.html, reprinted in CRYPTO ANARCHY, CYBERSTATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS 28 
(Peter Ludlow ed., 2001); JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE 
INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006).  Following this lead, much of 
early cyberlaw scholarship argued that traditional laws ought not apply to 
cyberspace and virtual worlds.  See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David G. Post,  And 
How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, 
Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62, 65 (Brian Kahin & James H. 
Keller eds., 1997) (arguing for a decentralized system of Internet governance); I. 
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 
1015–25 (1994) (advocating self-help, custom, and contract to regulate 
cyberspace); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1387–91 (1996) (noting possibilities of internal 
regulation of the Internet through competing rule sets); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 
Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 419 (1997) (contending that as a general rule “self-
governance is desirable for electronic communities”); Joel R. Reidenberg, 
Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 912–17 (1996) 
(arguing that attempts to define rules for the development of cyberspace “rely on 
disintegrating concepts of territory and sector, while ignoring the new network 
and technological borders that transcend national boundaries”); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through 
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998) (arguing for a “Lex Informatica,” which 
would regulate cyberspace through technological devices); Symposium, Governing 
Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 161 (1996) (arguing for metaphor of cyberspace 
as separate space). 
 2. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE 
INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW xi 
(1999). 
 3. Id.  
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and stable Internet connectivity remain a privilege for wealthy 
citizens living in wealthy states?  And what if governments around 
the world take measures to block connectivity in a bid to suppress 
the destabilizing effects that the Internet, and the ideas it can 
quickly disseminate, can have on social or political order?  This is 
not merely academic.  If there is anything we have learned from 
recent protest movements, including the so-called “Arab Spring,” 
and heavy-handed government efforts to block, censor, suspend, 
and manipulate connectivity, it is that Internet access is anything 
but certain, especially when governments feel threatened.4 
Despite these cold realities and hard truths about connectivity, 
the notion that people have a “right” to Internet access gained 
high-profile international recognition this year.  In a report to the 
United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly earlier this year (the 
Report), the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 
Frank La Rue, held that Internet access should be recognized as a 
human right.5  The finding garnered much international attention 
and acclaim.6  But at the same time, there has yet been very little 
 
 4. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. 
& TECH. J. 213, 223 (2003) (“States cannot ignore, and are likely to pursue, 
additional means of enforcement through intermediaries or proxies.  Various 
points in the network infrastructure serve as gateways that in effect re-centralize 
access to the Internet.  These gateways might be access providers, hosting services, 
or major switching hubs that are located within the jurisdiction of the interested 
state.  The existence of these gateway points in an otherwise decentralized network 
entices states to focus efforts and find enforcement mechanisms that operate 
through the intermediaries at these points.”); Sahar Khamis & Katherine Vaughn, 
Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism 
Tilted the Balance, ARAB MEDIA & SOC’Y, Summer 2011, available at 
http://www.arabmediasociety.org/articles/downloads/20110603105609_Khamis.p
df (describing former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s effort to quell 
protesters by shutting down the Internet for nearly a week); Jillian C. York, Policing 
Content in the Quasi-Public Sphere, OPENNET INITIATIVE BULL., 4–5 (2010), 
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/PolicingContent.pdf (citing Internet 
surveillance and censorship in such countries as China and Iran). 
 5. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends 
and Challenges to the Right of all Individuals to Seek, Receive and Impart Information and 
Ideas of All Kinds Through the Internet, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur] (by Frank La 
Rue). 
 6. See, e.g., At the Crossroads of Globalization: Access to the Internet is Now a 
Human Right, THE MAJALLA (June 9, 2011), http://www.majalla.com/eng/2011/06 
/article3548; Matthew Davis, Internet Access a Human Right?, JAKARTAGLOBE (July 12, 
2011), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/bytethis/internet-access-a-human-
right/452356; The Current: Internet Access as a Human Right, CBCRADIO (June 9, 
2011), http://www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/episode/2011/06/09/internet-access-as-a-
human-right; Internet as a Human Right: Not Just a Wishful Thinking, TFM&A INDIA 
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systematic study of the Report, and the ideas about rights set out 
therein.  This article aims to change this. 
After all, this clear international recognition for Internet rights 
by a report tabled before the U.N. General Assembly raises some 
important questions.  Where did these ideas arise from?  Did they 
arise as a product of the technological changes of the times, or is 
there a broader evolution of ideas that might give some sense of 
their future direction?  Comprehensive answers to these questions 
would take us far beyond the scope of this article; I will, 
nevertheless, aim to at least provide the first steps, or a foundation, 
for proper answers.  Taking the Report as my focus, I trace the 
history and intellectual origins behind the Report’s key findings on 
Internet access rights, linking the notion of Internet rights to a 
broader international and political context of evolving ideas about 
expression, information, and communication.  This context will, I 
hope, tell us something not just about where these ideas came 
from, but their future movement too. 
Indeed, the Report was not the first legal or institutional 
recognition of such ideas.  In fact, ideas about “rights” to Internet 
access have slowly gained momentum around the world in recent 
years.7  In May 2009, the French parliament passed a new online 
 
(June 10, 2011), http://tfmaindia.com/internet-as-a-human-right-not-just-a-
wishful-thinking; Robin Hicks, Should Internet Access Be a Basic Human Right?, ASIA 
PAC. FUTUREGOV (July 6, 2011), http://www.futuregov.asia/articles/2010/jul/06 
/should-internet-access-be-basic-human-right; David Kravets, U.N. Report Declares 
Internet Access a Human Right, WIRED (June 3, 2011, 2:47 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/internet-a-human-right; Dave Lee, 
Should Internet Users Ever Be Cut Off?, BBC (June 11, 2011, 01:39 UK), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/9509215.stm; Nathan 
Olivarez-Giles, United Nations Report: Internet Access is a Human Right, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES TECH. BLOG (June 3, 2011, 6:42 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com 
/technology/2011/06/united-nations-report-internet-access-is-a-human-
right.html; Nidhi Subbaraman, UN Report: Internet Access is a Basic Human Right, 
TECHNOLOG ON MSNBC.COM (June 3, 2011, 6:40 PM), http:// 
technolog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/06/03/6781285-un-report-internet-
access-is-a-basic-human-right; United Nations: Disconnecting People from the Internet Is a 
Violation of Human Rights, AUSTRALIANPOLICYONLINE (June 15, 2011), 
http://www.apo.org.au/research/united-nations-disconnecting-people-internet-
violation-human-rights; United Nations: Internet Access Is a Human Right, 
DUBAICHRONICLE (June 7, 2011), http://www.dubaichronicle.com 
/2011/06/07/united-nations-internet-access-is-a-human-right; United Nations report: 
Internet Access Is a Human Right, ETHIOPIAN REV. (June 3, 2011, 9:42 PM), 
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/20111/415708; UN Names Internet Access 
‘Basic Human Right’, VOICE OF RUSSIA (June 7, 2011, 10:55 Moscow Time), 
http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/06/07/51381532.html.  
 7. And, past scholarship has, elsewhere, discussed the Internet in the 
context of human rights.  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNET (Steven 
4
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copyright infringement law known as HADOPI, which gave power 
to a government agency to cut off people’s Internet access for 
repeated copyright infringement.8  A month later, the country’s 
Conseil Constitutionnel, or national constitutional court, found 
this power to cut off Internet connectivity an unconstitutional 
restriction on citizens’ right to “freedom of expression and 
communication.”9  In October 2009, the Finnish government 
passed a law making it a “right” not only for its citizens to have 
Internet access, but that the service provided by 
telecommunications companies must offer connectivity speeds of at 
least one megabit-per-second (Mbps).10  And in New Zealand, back 
in 2008, Internet access was likened to a basic human right by key 
government officials.11  
These instances may suggest a broader trend, but might also 
be seen as simply a handful of countries experimenting with 
different notions of Internet rights.  Indeed, among these 
examples, there was no clear recognition for such ideas from a 
high level international body or high profile official.  None, that is, 
until the Report, the focus of this article. 
My discussion is divided into several sections.  In section II, I 
provide some preliminary thoughts on some threads of intellectual 
thought that likely influenced the ideas in the Report.  In section 
III, I turn my focus to the history and intellectual origins of the 
 
Hick et al. eds., 2000).  But often these works take a more conservative approach, 
avoiding the claim that Internet access should be conceived as a fundamental 
right.  See Michael L. Best, Can the Internet Be a Human Right?, 4 HUM. RTS. & HUM. 
WELFARE 23, 24 (2004).  
 8. French Online Copyright Infringement Law Faces Challenges but May Create 
Business Opportunities, TELECOMM., MEDIA & ENT. UPDATE (Hogan & Hartson LLP, 




 9. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-
580DC, June 10, 2009, J.O. 9675 (Fr.), translated in Act Furthering the Diffusion and 
Protection of Creation on the Internet, Décision n° 2009-580, 4 (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm 
/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf. 
 10. Saeed Ahmed, Fast Internet Access Becomes a Legal Right in Finland, CNN 
(October 15, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/15 
/finland.internet.rights/index.html. 
 11. Judith Tizard, the former Minister of Justice in New Zealand, suggested 
Internet connectivity was a basic human right.  Government Wavers on Web Cut-offs, 
STUFF.CO.NZ, http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/it-telcos/644613 (“Judith is of 
the mind that Internet access is almost a human right now, similar to water and 
electricity.”) (last updated Sept. 25, 2008).  
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right to “seek, receive, and impart information,” which constitutes 
the central basis for the Report.  After setting out that history, I 
read the Report in light of this history in section IV and briefly set 
out some directions forward in section V.  For greater clarity before 
moving on, when I say “Internet,” I mean the global system of 
public and private “electronics, computers, and communication 
networks” all connected and linked via the same basic architecture, 
the Internet’s TCP/IP protocol.12  My use is largely consistent with 
popular understandings of the term, but will range from more 
popular components of the Internet, like the World Wide Web, to 
those components, or services, growing in popularity, like cloud-
computing.   
II. INTERNET ACCESS RIGHTS: TWO THREADS OF THOUGHT 
What does a “right” to Internet access mean?  Presumably, this 
means someone has the right to connect to the Internet without 
any kind of state interference with that right of access.  But this 
simple explanation masks more complex issues, like whether such a 
right is not only negative, that is, it protects against government 
intrusion, but also imposes positive obligations on a state or 
government to provide Internet access, or a certain kind of access.  
The Special Rapporteur examined Internet access rights in both 
senses, not only talking about people’s freedom to access Internet 
content,13 but also state obligations to provide access to the physical 
infrastructure necessary for Internet connectivity.14  Though, the 
Report (and I will say more on this later) spends much more time 
on the former notion of Internet access rights, setting out ways that 
states are restricting access to the Internet, and its content, 
including filtering, censoring, criminalization of expression, 
intermediary liability, and cyber-attacks.15  
These two aspects of Internet rights, their negative and positive 
components, have many different intellectual origins, not the least 
of which is political philosophy and rights theory more generally.16  
 
 12. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193, 1195 (1998).  
 13. Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 9–16. 
 14. Id. at 16–19. 
 15. The Report recommendations demonstrate this too, providing several 
more recommendations on the former, compared to the latter.  See id. at 19–22. 
 16. Twentieth century political philosopher Isaiah Berlin famously 
distinguished between the “negative” and “positive” notions of liberty in the 
history of political philosophy and rights theory.  See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of 
Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 121 (1969).  
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But there are also more current threads of thought, tied more 
closely to Internet scholarship that should be examined to 
understand the broader findings of the Report.  I examine them 
next.  
Modern notions of a right to Internet access owe themselves to 
two more recent threads of intellectual thought: cyber-
libertarianism and the “right to communicate.”  This section 
discusses both of these in some detail. 
A. Cyber-Libertarianism  
Freedom, liberty, and the uniqueness of “cyberspace” were 
heralded by the first generation of the Internet’s thinkers, writers, 
and intellectuals—the cyber-libertarians and “information-age 
luminaries” like John Parry Barlow, Alvin Toffler, George Gilder, 
and Esther Dyson, whose thinking helped forge the early 
intellectual foundations for theorizing the Internet experience.17  
These ideals and ideas were, says Lawrence Lessig, the “founding 
values of the Net.”18 
These “founding values” received much attention from tech 
writers and cyberlaw scholars in the 1990s.  In his famous A 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Barlow proclaimed that 
he spoke with “no greater authority than that with which liberty 
itself always speaks.”19  Lessig’s influential Code as Law explained 
that the “challenge for our generation” is to “protect liberty” in 
cyberspace in the face of “architectures of control.”20  And Yochai 
Benkler’s similarly popular The Wealth of Networks explores concepts 
of human freedom.21  First generation cyberlaw scholarship, 
influenced by these ideas, thus offered innovative ways to preserve 
liberty, self-government, and autonomy in cyberspace from 
coercion.22 
Given the uniqueness and importance these thinkers 
 
 17. NICK DYER-WITHEFORD, CYBER-MARX: CYCLES AND CIRCUITS OF STRUGGLE IN 
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CAPITALISM 34 (1999); FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE TO 
CYBERCULTURE: STEWART BRAND, THE WHOLE EARTH NETWORK, AND THE RISE OF 
DIGITAL UTOPIANISM 261 (2006). 
 18. Lawrence Lessig, quoted in Wen Stephenson, The Values of Code (and Code): 
An Email Exchange with Lawrence Lessig, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE (Dec. 13, 1999), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/unbound/digicult/lessig.htm. 
 19. Barlow, supra note 1, at 28. 
 20. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 xv (2006). 
 21. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006). 
 22. See sources cited supra note 1. 
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attributed to the “cyberspace” experience and the new possibilities 
offered by the Internet, it is not surprising that one of the first 
modern expressions of a “right” or “freedom” of Internet 
connectivity emerged within this 1990s intellectual paradigm.  In a 
1997 piece entitled “Freedom to Connect” published in Wired 
Magazine, Leila Conners wrote that “[a]n essential component of 
the emerging global culture is the ability and freedom to connect—
to anyone, anytime, anywhere, for anything.”23   
Before going further into the substance of Conners’s piece, it 
is worthwhile noting a few things about the place of publication.  
Wired Magazine was very influential in the 1990s among those 
interested in the Internet and related communication technology; 
it was the “Bible of Cyberspace.”24  The magazine, for example, 
described itself as a “journal of record for the future” that “speaks 
not just to high-tech professionals and the business savvy, but also 
to the forward-looking, the culturally astute, and the simply 
curious.”25 
So, Wired Magazine was not just a mouthpiece for the cyber-
libertarian writers—that would be an oversimplification; the 
magazine, after all, aimed to speak to more than just the 
information technology community, but also broad social and 
political events.26  Still, Wired Magazine’s editorial line generally 
followed the same optimism about technology and the “new forms 
of social interaction and community” that the Internet offered.27  
That an article heralding a “right” or “freedom” to connect to the 
Internet appeared in its pages, then, is consistent with the broader 
intellectual currents in which Wired was situated, particularly 
throughout the 1990s.   
Conners, though having a background in international politics 
and policy, was also familiar with the potential of media and 
technology.28  A year before publishing her piece, she founded a 
multimedia group called Tree Media, which “creates” media to 
“support and sustain civil society.”29  Her piece, interestingly, 
 
 23. Leila Conners, Freedom to Connect, WIRED MAGAZINE, Aug. 1997, at 106. 
 24. SHEILA STEINBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES 280 
(2007). 
 25. Wired description as reprinted in DAVID BELL ET AL., CYBERCULTURE: THE 
KEY CONCEPTS 191 (2004). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. About Leila Conners, TREE MEDIA GROUP, http://www.treemedia.com 
/treemedia.com/Leila.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
 29. Id. 
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combined a kind of internationalism with optimism about 
technology and the Internet.  It heralded a “freedom to connect” 
not as a right in the period in which she was writing, but that might 
be recognized and affirmed in the future:  
Someday this freedom may be seen as a basic human 
right, very closely aligned with the right of free speech.  
But while the freedom to connect is fairly widespread 
today, its foundations are shaky.  As more nations grapple 
with the politics of connectivity, the liberty to log on may 
diminish.30   
Along with her discussion, Conners included a two page map of the 
world, which indicated the level of Internet censorship and 
regulation across different countries.31   
Interestingly, Conners offers no thoughts on the obligation of 
states to provide Internet access.  Instead, she speaks of it as a 
“basic human right” and connects it to free speech, saying the two 
ideas are closely related.32  She also brings an internationalist 
perspective, emphasizing the need to be vigilant about guarding 
these things not just in the United States, but also elsewhere in the 
world.33  All of these ideas follow the cyber-libertarian line: 
emphasizing liberty and the need to prevent states from regulating 
and interfering with the Internet.  Many of these themes, as we 
shall see later, are apparent in more contemporary conceptions of 
the Internet as a basic right or freedom.   
B. The International “Right to Communicate”  
A second line of thought relevant to the intellectual origins of 
modern ideas of Internet access rights is one Conners may have 
also drawn on, given her background in international politics and 
policy.  That is, the movement, also in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
was for international recognition of a “right to communicate.”  
Though the idea of a “right to communicate” was articulated 
as early as 1969 by the late U.N. official Jean d’Arcy (who believed 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) would one 
day recognize such a right), it did not gain momentum until the 
mid-1980s among certain international institutions like U.N. 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, or UNESCO.34  
 
 30. Conners, supra note 23, at 106. 
 31. Id. at 106–107. 
 32. Id. at 106. 
 33. Id. 
 34. CEES J. HAMELINK, THE POLITICS OF WORLD COMMUNICATIONS: A HUMAN 
9
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In 1980, UNESCO brought the idea of a “right to communicate” to 
the international stage when its General Conference in Belgrade 
passed a resolution recognizing it as a “right of the public, of ethnic 
and social groups and of individuals to have access to information 
sources and to participate actively in the communication process.”35  
UNESCO also recognized the idea in subsequent resolutions in 
1981 and 1983, and in 1985 UNESCO consultants prepared a 
“status report” on the right.36 
However, by the early 1990s, international interest in the idea 
began to wane.  UNESCO showed less inclination to promote the 
idea in subsequent meetings.37  And subsequent efforts by other 
international organizations and officials to take up the cause had 
little success.38  The movement to codify communication rights 
internationally ultimately failed to gain traction for a number of 
reasons, not the least of which was that the rights, so expressed and 
advocated by these institutions, implied a kind of international 
obligation to provide a means for people to communicate that 
states in either the First or Third Worlds had neither the resources 
nor will to support or subsidize.39   
However, the notion of a “right to communicate” is clearly 
relevant to more recent Internet access rights claims, given the 
latter’s centrality in modern forms of interaction and global 
communication.  Indeed, such claims for communication rights 
cleared the path for early insistence on the importance of access to 
the Internet and other information and communications 
technology (ICT), like the “Declaration of Principles” issued at the 
2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a summit 
convened by the U.N. Secretary General.40  In addition to affirming 
that “[c]ommunication is a fundamental social process,” the 
Declaration also proclaimed a “commitment to build a people-
centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society, 
where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information 
 
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 293–98 (1994). 
 35. UNESCO Res. 4/19, Recs. of the General Conference, 21st Sess., Vol. 1, 
Sept. 23–Oct. 28, 1980 at 69, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001140 
/114029e.pdf; HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 297. 
 36. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 297. 
 37. Id. at 298. 
 38. Id. at 297–300. 
 39. Karol Jakubowicz, The Right to Public Expression: A Modest Proposal for an 
Important Human Right, MEDIAPOLICY.ORG, 4–5 (2010), http://mediapolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/right-to-freedom-of-expression1.pdf. 
 40. Best, supra note 7, at 24. 
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and knowledge.”41  Insisting on the social, cultural, and economic 
importance of ICT access is only a degree removed from insisting 
on Internet access as a “right” for similar reasons.  Thus, the WSIS 
has today become a forum for groups like the Association of 
Progressive Communications, who go beyond the 2003 principles 
in advocating for universal Internet access.42 
The “right to communicate” also attempted to build on earlier 
entrenched international recognition for both free expression and 
freedom of information.43 But it was largely unsuccessful in gaining 
any lasting traction in the world community, so it thus offers a 
lesson of caution for Internet rights advocates.44  But, as the next 
section will show, the failure of the communication rights 
movement is not the end of the story for Internet access rights.   
III. THE RIGHT TO SEEK, RECEIVE, AND IMPART INFORMATION 
Having given some preliminary background, both intellectual 
and legal-historical, for ideas about Internet access rights, I want to 
focus more specifically on the Special Rapporteur’s central legal 
foundation for his conception: the right to “seek, receive and 
impart information.”45   
A. The Special Rapporteur’s Findings and Article 19(2) 
Indeed, in the Report’s summary this right is mentioned in the 
very first line and given importance first and foremost in relation to 
the Internet.46  It is mentioned several times throughout the 
document and, again, at the very outset of the Report’s 
recommendations.47  The source that the Special Rapporteur cites 
 
 41.  World Summit on the Information Society: Geneva Declaration of 
Principles, ITU (Dec. 10–12, 2003), http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official 
/dop.html. 
 42. APC… on Internet Governance, ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE COMM., http:// 
www.apc.org/en/blog/apc-internet-governance (speaking of APC’s advocacy at 
the WSIS, and affirming its commitment to “[e]nsuring internet access is universal 
and affordable”) (last visited Sept. 10, 2011). 
 43. Jakubowicz, supra note 39, at 4 (discussing how the “right to 
communicate” movement failed because its advocates failed to offer a means by 
which states could turn the right to freedom of expression into a “positive” right 
that would impose obligations on states to “give them the tools of public 
expression”). 
 44. Id. at 2, 4. 
 45. Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1, 4, 7, 10, 19. 
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for this right is Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil 
Political Rights (ICCPR): “Everyone shall have the right to freedom 
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through 
any other media of his choice.”48   
So, understanding the Report’s finding concerning Internet 
access rights, which is based on the “right to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas,”49 requires understanding the legal 
and historical context underlying the language of the right, which 
is drawn from Article 19(2) of the ICCPR.  In other words, the 
history and origins of the former are no doubt informed by those 
of the latter. 
In this section, I trace the origins and history of this language, 
which basically codifies a broader international legal paradigm 
concerning freedom of information and expression: the Free Flow 
of Information Paradigm.  The origins of the Free Flow of 
Information Paradigm in international law and politics go back to 
at least the Second World War, when the movement to adopt 
international covenants and bills of rights gained momentum.50  
The right to “seek, receive and impart information,” codified in the 
UDHR and ICCPR and re-invoked in the Report, emerged from 
within this paradigm.  I set out this history in the next section.  
B. History and Origins 
1. The Free Flow of Information Paradigm 
Freedom of information and expression “figured prominently” 
in Post-War efforts to draft international covenants and bills of 
rights.51  This was due in large part to American influence and its 
 
 48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 49. Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 1, 4. 
 50. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 152.  
 51. Id.; see also id. at 153 (describing subsequent treaties and efforts aimed at 
freedom of information); K. Venkata Raman, Towards a New World Information and 
Communication Order: Problems of Access and Cultural Development, in THE STRUCTURE 
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1027, 1035–36 
(Ronald St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983); PHILIP M. TAYLOR, 
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE MEDIA SINCE 1945, at 
30–31 (1997); Muhammad I. Ayish, International Communication in the 1990s: 
Implications for the Third World, 68 INT’L AFF. 487, 490 (1992); Fred H. Cate, The First 
Amendment and the “Free Flow” of Information, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 371, 373–74 (1990); 
Marian Koren, Human Rights of Children: Their Right to Information, 2 HUM. RTS. REV. 
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allies in the West.52  Spurred on by the U.S. Congress and the First 
Amendment values of the growing American media—that a free 
press and free exchange in the “marketplace of ideas” was essential 
to determining truth and preserving other fundamental rights—
freedom of information became a key element of U.S. foreign 
policy in the 1940s and 1950s.53  Of course, media and 
newsgathering was essential to this project, given its role in 
transmitting information and ideas around the world.54  Indeed, 
newspapers and other media groups also promoted these ideas 
abroad.55  For example, as early as 1945, the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors travelled to various countries to promote the 
“unrestricted” free exchange of ideas and information around the 
world, which it called the “free flow doctrine.”56 
But this new international focus on freedom of information 
was not just a product of American influence; it also had to do with 
the difficult challenges facing the world community in the Post-War 
period.  Two central issues for a world community that was war-
weary and longing for peace and stability were war propaganda and 
state censorship.57  War propaganda was used extensively in the 
First World War and that use only intensified in the Second World 
War with the rise of mass media, particularly propaganda via 
shortwave radio.58  And as governments used propaganda on their 
own citizens to ensure national support for war efforts and on 
foreign countries for psychological warfare, they also took steps to 
censor both national and foreign media—radio frequency 
“jamming” of international broadcasts was used by many countries 
during the war.59  If the Post-War world community was serious 
about keeping, preserving, and promoting peace, they would have 
to do something to address these problems. 
The consensus solution, successfully promoted internationally 
by the United States and its Western allies at the U.N. and its newly 
created agencies, was to promote the free and unrestricted flow of 
 
54, 60–61 (2001). 
 52. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 153. 
 53. Id. at 153–54; Ayish, supra note 51, at 490; Cate, supra note 51, at 373–74; 
Koren, supra note 51, at 54.  
 54. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 152. 
 55. Id. at 152–53.  
 56. Id. at 152.  
 57. Id. at 136, 151; Raman, supra note 51, at 1035. 
 58. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 137.  
 59. Id. 
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information and ideas globally.60  The idea was that guaranteeing 
this would address both issues at once: opposing media restrictions 
and state censorship would also resolve the problem of war 
propaganda, as the diversity of expression, ideas, and opinions 
ensured by the flow of information across borders would render 
propaganda ineffective.61  
The consensus that a “free flow” of ideas would best battle war 
propaganda and censorship reflected this broader Post-War Free 
Flow of Information Paradigm, which emphasized the unrestricted 
international flow of information and expression.62  In this 
paradigm of international law and politics, freedom of information 
was promoted not simply as a means to fight war propaganda and 
censorship, but as a foundational right in and of itself, linked to 
other important rights, freedoms, and interests, like free 
expression, progress, and peace.63   
a. The Free Flow Principle and Freedom of Information as 
Foundational to Other Freedoms 
There were a few ideas or principles important to this 
Paradigm.  The first was the idea that freedom of information was a 
foundational freedom and essential to promoting other important 
rights, interests, and freedoms, like free expression, progress, and 
peace.64  The second key idea was the “Free Flow” principle,65 which 
followed logically from the first principle.  The Free Flow principle 
mandated that the free and unrestricted flow of information across 
borders and around the world should be maximized.66  Both of 
 
 60. Id. at 153; Altaf Gauhar, Free Flow of Information: Myths and Shibboleths, 1 
THIRD WORLD Q. 53, 55 (1979). 
 61. See John B. Whitton, The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information 
and the Movement Against International Propaganda, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 73, 74 (1949) 
(describing attending the Conference). 
 62. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 153; see also Jan Servaes, Communication and 
Development Paradigms: An Overview, in COMMUNICATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 
ANTHOLOGY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 283, 286–87 (Alfonso 
Gumucio-Dagron & Thomas Tufte eds., 2006) (discussing the infusion of western 
ideals regarding freedom of information into the Post-War Freedom of 
Information Paradigm); Cate, supra note 51, at 373−74.  See generally ACHAL MEHRA, 
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION: A NEW PARADIGM (Greenwood Press, Inc. 1986) 
(describing the history and barriers of the international free flow of information).   
 63. Koren, supra note 51, at 54–55.  
 64. Id. 
 65. I borrow this nomenclature from Herbert I. Schiller.  See Herbert I. 
Schiller, The Genesis of the Free Flow of Information Principle, in CRISIS IN 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 161 (Jim Richstad & Michael H. Anderson eds., 1981). 
 66. Koren, supra note 51, at 54, 60.  
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these ideas or principles are apparent in Resolution 59(I), the 
U.N.’s first declaration on Freedom of Information, which was 
adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly in its very first 
session in 1946: 
Freedom of information is a fundamental human 
right and is the touchstone of all freedoms to which the 
United Nations is consecrated; 
Freedom of information implies the right to gather, 
transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere 
without fetters.  As such it is an essential factor  in any 
serious effort to promote the peace and progress of the 
world . . . .67 
Freedom of information is so foundational, the Resolution 
declared that it touched all fundamental freedoms recognized by 
the U.N.68  And, following from this, freedom of information must 
be guaranteed, including the “right” to “gather,” “transmit,” and 
“publish” news “anywhere” freely and “without fetters.”69   
In order to follow up on these declarations, that same 
resolution also announced an intention “to authorize the holding 
of a conference of all Members of the United Nations on freedom 
of information.”70 
These two principles were also apparent in UNESCO’s 
founding constitution of 1945.  UNESCO was founded as the 
U.N.’s “principal arm” to carry out the aims of security and peace 
in the U.N. Charter,71 and its constitution states:  
[Signatory states] believing in full and equal opportunities 
for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of 
objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and 
knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to 
increase the means of communication between their 
peoples and to employ these means for the purpose of 
mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect 
knowledge of each other’s lives.72 
Again, freedom of information and the “free exchange of ideas and 
 
 67. Declaration on Freedom of Information, G.A. Res. 59 (I), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/59/1 (Dec. 14, 1946); HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 153; TAYLOR, supra note 
51, at 30–31. 
 68. Declaration on Freedom of Information, supra note 67. 
 69. Id. 
 70. EDWARD H. LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 536 (Mary Lou 
Bertucci et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996). 
 71. TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 30–31. 
 72. UNESCO’S CONSTITUTION (1945), reprinted in TAYLOR, supra note 51, at 
30–31 (alteration in original).  
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knowledge” are to be promoted as they are linked to other 
fundamental goals and interests including “objective truth” and 
“mutual understanding.”73  Following its constitution, a special 
section was created in UNESCO’s Mass Communication Division to 
deal with the “free flow of information.”74   
Subsequently, two international agreements were concluded 
under the “auspices” of UNESCO, which promote international 
circulation of cultural, scientific, and educational materials.75  
These included the Agreement for Facilitating the International 
Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Character, signed December 10, 1948; and 
the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Materials, Lake Success, signed November 22, 1950.76  
Again, each agreement promotes the freer flow of information and 
cultural materials.  
These ideas appear again and again.  Pursuant to the 1946 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution noted above, the U.N. 
Conference on Freedom of Information (the Conference) was 
convened in Geneva in 1948 by the U.N. Economic and Social 
Council.77  Fifty-four countries participated in the Conference.78  
The “major objective” of the Conference, reflected in Resolution 
59(I), was “the improvement in the means of sending information 
across frontiers in accordance with the view, solemnly affirmed by 
the Conference, that freedom of information is a fundamental 
human right . . . .”79 
The Conference issued a number of resolutions and authored 
three draft conventions on freedom of information.80  The very first 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Gauhar, supra note 60, at 55.  
 75. Egon Schwelb, International Conventions on Human Rights, 9 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 654, 662 n.24 (1960) (“The Agreement of 1948 is in force among 14 States.  
It has been signed, but not ratified, by eight. The Agreement of 1950 is in force 
among 33 States. It has been signed, but not ratified, by 9.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. LAWSON, supra note 70, at 536.  
 78. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, Mar. 23–Apr. 21, 1948, 
Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information, U.N. Doc. 
E/CONF.6/79, App. I [hereinafter U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information] 
(listing the delegations attending); HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 153.  See Zechariah 
Chafee Jr., Legal Problems of Freedom of Information in the United States, 14 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 547 (1949) (describing the sessions in the Sub-Commission 
and at the Conference). 
 79. As described by John B. Whitton, who attended the Conference.  See 
Whitton, supra note 61, at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C, 
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resolution issued, Resolution No. 1, affirmed the following General 
Principles: 
Freedom of information is a fundamental human right of 
the people, and is the touchstone of all freedoms to which 
the United Nations is dedicated, without which world 
peace cannot well be preserved; and 
Freedom of information carries the right to gather, 
transmit, and disseminate news anywhere and everywhere 
without fetters; and 
Freedom of information depends for its validity upon 
the availability to the people of a diversity of sources of 
news and of opinion; and  
Freedom of information further depends upon the 
willingness of the press and other agencies of information 
to employ the privileges derived from the people without 
abuse, and to accept and comply with the obligations to 
seek the facts without prejudice and to spread knowledge 
without malicious intent . . . .81 
It was also at the Conference that freedom of information was 
linked more clearly to freedom of expression and opinion,82 which 
was a logical connection given that press freedom and the free 
exchange of ideas requires free expression as much as a free flow of 
information, expression, and ideas.  Thus, the draft Convention on 
Freedom of Information issued by the Conference’s Final Act, 
declared “that the free interchange of information and opinions, 
both in the national and in the international sphere, is a 
fundamental human right”;83 Conference Resolution No. 28 hailed 
“free interchange of information and opinions promotes the welfare 
of all nations and is indispensable to the peace of the world”;84 and 
Resolution No. 26, which dealt with “Measures Concerning the 
Free Publication and Reception of Information” recommended:  
[T]hat States should from time to time review their laws of 
libel, taking into consideration the general conclusions of 
this Conference, in order to remove anomalies, and to 
secure to all persons the maximum freedom of expression 
 
ch. I, Res. No. 1–6; HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 154. 
 81. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C, 
ch. I, Res. No. 1. 
 82. Id. at Annex A, Draft Convention on Freedom of Information (“[T]he 
free interchange of information and opinions, both in the national and in the 
international sphere, is a fundamental human right . . . .”). 
 83. Id. (emphasis added).  
 84. Id. at Annex C, ch. III, Res. No. 28. 
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compatible with the maintenance of order and with due 
regard to the rights of others . . . .85 
And, returning to the free flow principle—which embodies the 
importance of freedom of information and expression—Resolution 
No. 2, which concerned the challenge of war propaganda, 
affirmed: 
Whereas the attainment of a just and lasting peace 
depends in great degree upon the free flow of true and 
honest information to all peoples and upon the spirit of 
responsibility with which all personnel of the press and 
other agencies of information seek the truth and report 
the facts . . . .86 
These principles reflected the ideas of the U.N.’s General Assembly 
Resolution 59(I): emphasizing, again, how freedom of information 
is connected to other important “freedoms,” and the resolve to 
promote the unrestricted dissemination of information.87   
b. The Importance of the Means of Communication—
Particularly Mass Communications—to Freedom of Information, 
and State Obligations to Promote Them 
However, there is another recurring idea or principle of the 
Free Flow of Information Paradigm that is implied or is apparent in 
this resolution, and other documents, resolutions, and conventions 
of the period.  That is, the importance of the means by which 
information and communications are transmitted; that is, the 
importance of information mediums—particularly those providing 
mass communications—to freedom of information, and with this, 
certain positive obligations states might have to promote the 
freedom and accessibility of such media.  This is seen in the earlier 
Resolution 59(I), which implies the importance of media and 
mediums of information, when it spoke of the “right” to “gather, 
transmit, and publish news anywhere and everywhere without 
fetters.”88  Publication or transmission of news and information 
“anywhere and everywhere” is a function of the mediums of 
information (in this case, mass communications)—there must be 
some medium through which to transmit, and publish material and 
news all over the world. 
This same emphasis on the availability and importance of mass 
 
 85. Id. at Annex C, ch. III, Res. No. 26. 
 86. Id. at Annex C, ch. I, Res. No. 2. 
 87. See Declaration on Freedom of Information, supra note 67. 
 88. Id. ¶ 2. 
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communications media is apparent in the Conference Resolution 
No. 1, cited just above, discussing the importance of the “Press” 
and “other agencies of information” upon which “freedom of 
information” is dependent.89  It is also implied in the affirmation 
that freedom of information “depends” on the “availability to the 
people of a diversity of sources of news and of opinion.”90  Mediums 
of information that can reach a broad, even global, audience are 
essential to freedom of information.   
Given the importance of communications mediums that 
transmit news and information, it is not surprising that several 
resolutions and conventions issued by the Conference implied or 
explicitly required an obligation for states to ensure the freedom of 
mass communications media, and, in some cases, take steps to 
ensure citizens have access to mass media technology.91  Indeed, 
the U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information set down some of 
the first “normative standards for the mass media” in its various 
resolutions.92   
The Conference, for example, completed a draft Convention 
on the Gathering and International Transmission of News, which 
affirmed that “Contracting States” desired to “implement the right 
of their people to be fully informed” and “improve understanding 
between their peoples through the free flow of information and 
opinion.”93  Resolution No. 1, already noted and affirmed, among 
other things: 
That the right of news personnel to have the widest 
possible access to the sources of information, to travel 
unhampered in pursuit thereof, and to transmit copy 
without unreasonable or discriminatory limitations, 
should be guaranteed by action on the national and 
international plane . . . . 
. . . . 
That in order to prevent abuses of freedom of 
information, governments in so far as they are able should 
 
 89. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C, 
ch. I, Res. No. 1, pmbl. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Cess Hamelink, MacBride with Hindsight, in BEYOND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM: 
GLOBALIZATION, COMMUNICATION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 92, 92 n.3 
(Peter Golding & Phil Harris eds., 1997). 
 92. Id.  
 93. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex A, 
Draft Convention on the Gathering and International Transmission of News, 
pmbl. 
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support measures which will help to improve the quality 
of information and to make a diversity of news and 
opinion available to the people . . . . 
. . . . 
That encouragement should be given to the establishment 
and to the functioning within the territory of a State of 
one or more non-official organizations of persons 
employed in the collection and dissemination of 
information to the public, and that such organization or 
organizations should encourage the fulfilment [sic] inter 
alia of the following obligations by all individuals or 
organizations engaged in the collection and dissemination 
of information . . . .94 
Moreover, Chapter II of the Conference’s Final Act set out a 
number of the Conference’s resolutions that specifically addressed 
“Measures to Facilitate the Gathering and International 
Transmission of Information.”95  This included Resolution No. 13 
which set out measures to fight state censorship and also affirmed 
positive obligations on states to promote the freedom of mediums 
of mass communications.  Resolution No. 13 “[s]olemnly condemns 
the use in peace-time of censorship which restricts or controls 
freedom of information, and [i]nvites Governments to take the 
necessary steps to promote its progressive abolition . . . .”96 
Finally, Chapter III of the Conference’s Final Act set out a 
number of resolutions that addressed “Measures Concerning the 
Free Publication and Reception of Information.”97  Many of the 
resolutions required or recommended that states take certain steps 
to promote information flows via “mass media.”  For example, 
Resolution No. 25 recommended that “all Governments should, to 
the extent that they make available materials and facilities for the 
mass media, undertake not to discriminate on political or personal 
grounds or on the basis of race, nationality, sex, language or 
religion, or against minorities.”98 
And Resolution Number 27 recommended: 
[T]hat Governments should undertake to put no 
obstacles in the way of persons or groups wishing to 
 
 94. Id. at Annex C, ch. I, Res. No. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 7. 
 95. Id. at Annex C, ch. II, Draft Convention on the Gathering and 
International Transmission of News, pmbl. 
 96. Id. at Annex C, ch. II, Res. No. 13. 
 97. Id. at Annex C, ch. III Draft Convention on the Gathering and 
International Transmission of News, pmbl. 
 98. Id. at Annex C, ch. III, Res. No. 25. 
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express themselves through the means of mass 
communication, and should ensure insofar as they are 
able that persons do not suffer discrimination in the use 
of the media on political or personal grounds or on the 
basis of race, sex, language or religion . . . .99 
In other words, this third idea or principle—accessible and free 
mediums of mass communications and information—is inextricably 
linked to the two other principles: that freedom of information is a 
“fundamental” freedom and the “Free Flow Principle.”  That is, the 
promotion of the unrestricted flow of information nationally is a 
paramount aim.  Though certainly not encapsulating all ideas, 
policies, or principles discussed at this time, these three principles 
or elements reflected the heart of the Free Flow of Information 
Paradigm.  
It was from within this very Free Flow of Information Paradigm 
that the right to “seek, receive, and impart information” emerged, 
and found its way into Article 19 of the UDHR100 and Article 19(2) 
of the ICCPR,101 two documents central to the drafting and wording 
of section 14 itself.  The freedom to “seek, receive, and impart 
information,” I will show, invokes the key principles and ideas of 
the Free Flow of Information Paradigm, and so these principles 
constitute some of the key intellectual origins of the concept of 
Internet access rights set out in the Report.  
2. The Free Flow of Information Paradigm and the Origins of the 
Right to Seek, Receive, and Impart Information  
The right or freedom to “seek, receive, and impart 
information” emerged from within the Free Flow of Information 
Paradigm of international law and politics.  The U.N.’s Economic 
and Social Council established a Commission on Human Rights in 
February 1946 with the responsibility to oversee the drafting of an 
“international bill of rights” and “international declarations or 
covenants” on civil liberties, which would ultimately result in the 
drafting of the UDHR and the ICCPR.102  In early 1947, the 
Commission set up a Sub-commission on “Freedom of Information 
 
 99. Id. at Annex C, ch. III, Res. No. 27. 
 100. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1949), at art. 19. 
 101. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, at 
art. 19(2). 
 102. N.L. GUPTA, CROSSCULTURAL COMMUNICATION: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 302 
(1998); RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY: FROM 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 103 (2006). 
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and the Press,” which spent considerable time planning the U.N. 
Conference on Freedom of Information that the General Assembly 
had called for in 1946.103  The Commission held off finalizing 
language for provisions concerning freedom of expression and 
information in both the Declaration of Human Rights (later the 
UDHR) and the International Covenant on Human Rights (later 
the ICCPR) in order to receive input from the Conference.104 
In fact, the very first international document to use language 
reflected in the UDHR and ICCPR was Resolution 59(I), the U.N.’s 
1946 declaration on Freedom of Information, which, as already 
discussed above, cited the right to “gather, transmit, and 
disseminate news anywhere and everywhere without fetters” (an 
early permutation of the right to “seek, receive, and impart 
information”) in calling for an international conference on 
freedom of information.105  This language was later echoed in the 
preamble to the first resolution issued by that conference, 
convened in 1948, which recognized that “freedom of information 
carries the right to gather, transmit, and disseminate . . . .”106  
However, in the resolution itself, the right was ultimately expressed 
in language even closer to that later found in both the UDHR and 
ICCPR: “[E]veryone shall have the right to freedom of thought and 
expression: this shall include freedom to hold opinions without 
interference; and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
by any means and regardless of frontiers . . . .”107  Indeed, two early 
drafts of provisions for freedom of expression and information 
formulated by the Sub-commission and referred to the Conference 
for consideration—one drafted by the British delegation and one 
drafted by the United States (by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt herself)—
tracked the language of Resolution 59(I) and the 1948 
Conference’s Resolution No. 1: 
Draft 2: Draft Proposed by the Representative of the 
United States (Mrs. Roosevelt). 
Every one shall have the right to freedom of 
 
 103. See Declaration on Freedom of Information, supra note 67; Chafee, supra 
note 78, at 545. 
 104. Chafee, supra note 78, at 545; Josef L. Kunz, Freedom of Communications, 49 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 99, 100 (1954). 
 105. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text (discussing two principles 
apparent from the text of the declaration).  
 106. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C, 
ch. I, Res. No. 1, pmbl. 
 107. U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex C, 
ch. I, Res. No. 1, ¶ 1. 
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information, speech and expression. 
Every one shall be free to hold his opinion without 
molestation, to receive and seek information and the 
opinion of others from sources wherever situated, and to 
disseminate opinions and information, either by word, in 
writing, in the press, in books or by visual, auditive or 
other means.108 
The U.S. draft offered no limitations to the right, preferring 
instead to advocate for one general limitation.109   
The 1948 Conference on Freedom of Information, in addition 
to the numerous draft conventions and resolutions already 
discussed, would produce draft provisions for freedom of 
information and expression that would ultimately find their way 
into both the UDHR and the ICCPR.110  These drafts would also 
incorporate the language of Resolution 59(I), but also include 
elements of the sub-commission’s drafts.  To say the Conference 
draft provisions would prove influential is an understatement.  In 
fact, the Conference draft provision for “Article 17 and 18” of the 
“Draft Declaration on Human Rights” (which would become the 
UDHR) would be fully adopted, with little change, as the official 
text of the UDHR’s Article 19.111  Here is a comparison of the 
provisions.  First, the 1948 Conference Draft: “Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of thought and expression; this right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas by any means and 
regardless of frontiers.”112  And now, the final version of Article 19 
of the UDHR, which is strikingly similar: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”113  The ICCPR’s 1948 Conference draft provisions would 
prove similarly influential, with the ICCPR’s draft for Article 19 
closely tracking the language of the 1948 Conference draft 
provision.  Again, a comparison of the provisions, starting with the 
ICCPR 1948 Conference draft: 
 
 108. Chafee, supra note 78, at 581–82, app. I. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See U.N. Conference on Freedom of Information, supra note 78, at Annex 
B. 
 111. Chafee, supra note 78, at 545–46, 581–82, app. I; Kunz, supra note 104, at 
103. 
 112. Chafee, supra note 78, at 545–46, 581–82, app. I. 
 113. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 100, at art. 19. 
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Every person shall have the right to freedom of thought 
and the right to freedom of expression without 
interference by governmental action: this right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions, to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, by written or printed matter, in the form of 
art, or by legally operated visual or auditory devices.114 
And, the final text for Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, again, strikingly 
similar:  
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice.115   
In other words, we can draw a direct line from the ideas and 
principles of the 1948 Conference on Freedom of Information to 
the final drafts of Article 19 for the UDHR and Article 19 of the 
ICCPR, the latter of which was essential to the Report.  
In fact, if we return to Article 19 of the UDHR, we can see the 
three principles of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm 
reflected in its language: “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”116 
The first principle, which emphasized freedom of information 
as a foundational freedom that is inextricably connected to 
expression, is clearly reflected in the first two lines, which indicates 
that “freedom . . . to seek, receive, and impart information and 
ideas” is included in the broader right to “freedom of opinion and 
expression.”   
The second principle, which emphasized the Free Flow of 
Information, is reflected in the language codifying the “freedom” 
to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas.”  The use of 
“seek,” “receive,” and “impart” in unison aptly reflects the multi-
directional and communicative nature of information flows that are 
free and unrestricted: they are not static, but multi-directional and 
provide interactive give-and-take. 
 
 114. Chafee, supra note 78, at 582, app. II. 
 115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, at art. 
19(2). 
 116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 100, at art. 19. 
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And the third principle, recognizing the importance of free 
and accessible mass media to freedom of expression and 
information, is reflected in the final wording, which guaranteed the 
flow of information “through any media.”  Given that mass media 
was understood as essential to carrying information and ideas 
across the globe, the nod to “regardless of frontiers” is also a nod to 
mass media and its essential role in the project of free expression 
and information. 
These essential principles of the Free Flow of Information 
Paradigm, in which the language and understanding of the 
freedom to “seek, receive, and impart information” was forged, are 
thus also essential to understanding the rights to Internet access 
articulated in the Report. 
Moreover, the fact that the Special Rapporteur, who is a 
human rights lawyer from Guatemala, based his findings on 
Internet access rights primarily on Article 19 of the ICCPR, which 
codifies the principles of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm, 
has even more significance today, because since the apex of the 
Free Flow of Information Paradigm, a new competing paradigm 
concerning the international law and politics of media, 
information, and expression has emerged.  And that paradigm 
arose among both Third World and developing countries in the 
“south,” like Guatemala, and is oriented more toward their issues 
and challenges.117 
3. A New Competing Paradigm 
The Free Flow of Information Paradigm, largely advocated by 
the United States and other Western countries, remained 
influential at the international level for decades after the Post-War 
years.118  However, by the 1970s, a new paradigm began to emerge 
to challenge its predominance, and UNESCO would be the main 
“battleground” in which these competing paradigms would clash.119   
 
 117. See FREDERICK H. GAREAU, THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 129 (2002) (discussing how the promoters and 
advocates of a New World Information and Communication Order in the 1980s 
were attempting to champion the cause of Guatemala, which was concerned about 
how Western TV programming was putting its “culture at risk”).  For information 
about Frank La Rue’s home country origins, see Biography: Frank La Rue, UNITED 
STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/bio 
/?content=rue_frank (last visited Sept. 4, 2011). 
 118. Cate, supra note 51, at 373–75 (noting the paradigm went “virtually 
unchallenged” before the 1960s); see also HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 173. 
 119. HAMELINK, supra note 34, at 173; Ayish, supra note 51, at 490–93; Cate, 
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The Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies—who saw 
freedom of information as a threat to their security, as well as a 
powerful tool of Western influence—were the first to challenge the 
ideas of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm in the 1960s, but 
largely failed to gain any kind of international consensus or 
traction for their own ideas or proposals.120  Rather, it was a related 
but different movement driven largely by Third World countries, 
which gained much more international momentum in the 1970s.  
The role and participation of Third World nations in international 
politics grew throughout the 1960s, and by the end of that decade, 
these countries focused on what they perceived as an “imbalance” 
in global mass communications between wealthier and poorer 
countries.121  
This emerging paradigm rejected the unrestricted flow of free 
information and instead advocated state regulation of information 
and expression to guarantee more “balance” and to achieve certain 
social, political, and economic goals.122  These ideas were reflected 
in the movement’s notable call for a “New World Information and 
Communication Order” or NWICO, which was essentially a 
collection of proposals.123  And while the NWICO movement 
originated among Third World countries, some of its proposals on 
issues of media concentration and monopoly did gain support from 
other countries, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.124 
 
supra note 51, at 375–81; Gauhar, supra note 60, at 55–58; Stephen Raube-Wilson, 
The New World Information and Communication Order and International Human Rights 
Law, 9 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 107, 107–12 (1986) (describing the ongoing 
NWICO debate in UNESCO); Colleen Roach, The Movement for a New World 
Information and Communication Order: A Second Wave?, 12 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 
283, 283–85 (1990); William Fitzmaurice, Note, The New World Information and 
Communication Order: Is the International Programme for the Development of 
Communication the Answer?, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 953, 953–70 (1982–1983) 
(describing the various paradigms debated in UNESCO). 
 120. Cate, supra note 51, at 375–81; Gauhar, supra note 60, at 55–56. 
 121. Ayish, supra note 51, at 492–93; Cate, supra note 51, at 375–76; Raube-
Wilson, supra note 119, at 107–09.  See generally Fitzmaurice, supra note 119 
(discussing the international communication imbalance and a New World 
Information and Communication Order as the appropriate solution). 
 122. Ayish, supra note 51, at 492; Cate, supra note 51, at 375–76; Raube-Wilson, 
supra note 119, at 107–08. 
 123. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 119, at 954–55; Raube-Wilson, supra note 119, 
at 107–08.  The term is largely attributed to Tunisian UNESCO delegate and 
MacBride Commission member Mustapha Masmoudi.  See Cate, supra note 51, at 
377. 
 124. See Gough Whitlam, Living with the United States—British Dominions and New 
Pacific States, 1991 AUSTL. INT’L L. NEWS 59, 63–64  (noting that NWICO proposals 
received support at times from various countries, including Australia, Canada, and 
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Still, the United States and many Western countries saw 
similarities between the NWICO movement’s criticisms of the free 
flow doctrine and those of the Soviets, and thus saw it as a threat to 
freedom of information and free expression.125  Throughout the 
1970s, UNESCO became the battleground in which the ideals and 
principles of these competing paradigms clashed.126  The NWICO 
movement would reach its apex in the early 1980s, with UNESCO’s 
release of the MacBride Commission Report on a “New World 
Information and Communication Order.”127  Though the report 
did not adopt the more radical NWICO proposals, it did endorse 
many of the movement’s ideas—including recommending 
regulations on media to promote certain “social, cultural, 
economic and political goals.”128  Despite its more moderate 
proposals, the MacBride Commission Report proved controversial, 
leading the United States, which viewed the report as an attack on 
press freedom and the free flow of information, to withhold 
funding for UNESCO in 1982 and withdraw from the agency in 
1984.129  
Of course, in the context of these developments, the Free Flow 
of Information Paradigm and Article 19, did not fade into the 
background.  It, too, remained as an important competing 
paradigm.  In fact, the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) 
would issue a General Comment interpreting Article 19 of the 
ICCPR around the time that NWICO was gaining international 
support, reaffirming the free flow paradigmatic principles.130  
Before 1992, when the HRC began issuing specific comments on 
the various reports submitted by individual countries concerning 
their ICCPR compliance, the HRC’s General Comments were 
widely published as essential materials for interpreting the meaning 
 
New Zealand). 
 125. See Cate, supra note 51, at 388–90; Gauhar, supra note 60, at 56–57; Raube-
Wilson, supra note 119, at 108–09; Roach, supra note 119, at 284–85. 
 126. Ayish, supra note 51, at 492–93; Gauhar, supra note 60, at 56; Raube-
Wilson, supra note 119, at 107–09. 
 127. Ayish, supra note 51, at 493; Cate, supra note 51, at 384; Raube-Wilson, 
supra note 119, at 107–08. 
 128. Ayish, supra note 51, at 493; Cate, supra note 51, at 385; Raube-Wilson, 
supra note 119, at 107–08. 
 129. Ayish, supra note 51, at 493–94; Cate, supra note 51, at 388–92; Raube-
Wilson, supra note 119, at 107–08. 
 130. Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment 
No. 10: Freedom of Expression, art. 19, (June 29, 1983) [hereinafter General 
Comment No. 10], http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol) 
/2bb2f14bf558182ac12563ed0048df17?Opendocument. 
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and scope of articles in the ICCPR.131  The General Comment 
stated: 
Paragraph 2 requires protection of the right to freedom of 
expression, which includes not only freedom to “impart 
information and ideas of all kinds,” but also freedom to 
“seek” and “receive” them “regardless of frontiers” and in 
whatever medium, “either orally, in writing or in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice.”  Not all States parties have provided information 
concerning all aspects of the freedom of expression.  For 
instance, little attention has so far been given to the fact 
that, because of the development of modern mass media, 
effective measures are necessary to prevent such control 
of the media as would interfere with the right of everyone 
to freedom of expression in a way that is not provided for 
in paragraph 3.132 
The General Comment’s interpretation of Article 19 of the ICCPR 
itself reflects many of the principles and ideas of the Free Flow of 
Information Paradigm: the importance of the free flow of 
information and free and accessible mass media. 
So, when the Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue set out to 
explore the Internet rights in his Report, there was this broader 
background of competing paradigms from which to draw ideas.  
And, no doubt, he was likely aware of the NWICO paradigm 
because of a recent publication to which he contributed that 
discussed its development.133 
In articulating the nature and dimensions of Internet access 
rights and how they are threatened, the Special Rapporteur could 
 
 131. FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN & STEPHEN J. SCHNABLY, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES, CASES AND ANALYSIS 204 (2006) 
(noting that HRC comments are persuasive, but not binding authorities for 
interpreting the ICCPR); Shiyan Sun, The Understanding and Interpretation of the 
ICCPR in the Context of China’s Possible Ratification, 6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 17, 25 
(2007) (discussing General Comments as the “second most important basis” for 
interpreting the ICCPR, after the text itself).  
 132. General Comment No. 10, supra note 130. 
 133. See Guy Berger, What Africa Tells Us About Access to Information, FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION: THE RIGHT TO KNOW 86, 86 (2010), http://unesdoc.unesco.org 
/images/0019/001936/193653e.pdf (“However, this third phase was also a period 
that coincided with the New World Information Order initiative, which lent itself 
to legitimising state ownership and control.  As new regimes became entrenched 
in the 1970s and 1980s, so this “development” media became increasingly another 
kind of tool—i.e. one that was wielded to maintain political control. This meant a 
constriction and perversion of information, resulting in low volume, low value and 
low credibility information—in worst cases, hagiographic nonsense about the daily 
activities of the head of state.”). 
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have drawn on the NWICO paradigm and its ideas, which oriented 
concerns about freedom of information towards more social and 
economic aims, including media ownership and monopolies.  The 
central thrust of NWICO was, after all, about promoting state 
regulation of media, rather than telling states to keep hands off, to 
allow access to ideas and the mediums through which they could be 
communicated.134 
But it was not the principles of NWICO that defined the 
Report’s notion of Internet access rights.  There was no mention of 
the MacBride Commission Report, no mention of UNESCO, and 
no mention of the need to regulate for monopolies or for a greater 
role for states.  To the contrary, the main theme of the Report is 
that states constitute a great threat to the free flow of ideas of 
information and Internet freedom, and steps must be taken to 
address that threat and curtail the increasing regulation and 
censorship of the Internet by states.135  Thus, Article 19(2) and its 
broader historical context and principles formed the central 
foundation of the Special Rapporteur’s grand declaration 
concerning Internet access rights. 
IV. READING THE REPORT IN LIGHT OF THE FREE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION PARADIGM 
The previous section traced the origins of the ideas embodied 
in Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, and the Free Flow of Information 
Paradigm’s ideas that it codified.  This paradigm’s influence is seen 
in several aspects of the Report, and the conception of Internet 
access rights it discusses. 
The first principle of the Free Flow of Information Paradigm, 
which conceptualized freedom of information as a fundamental or 
foundational freedom tied to expression, is apparent throughout 
the Report.  Right from the very beginning, the Special Rapporteur 
links the “right to freedom of opinion and expression,” to the right 
to “seek, receive, and impart information” through the “Internet”; 
and in sections where the importance of the Internet as a medium 
for the “exchange [of] information and ideas” is linked to its 
capacity as a “key means” for the exercise of the right to “freedom 
of opinion and expression.”136 
The second principle, which emphasized the “free flow” of 
 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 122–30. 
 135. See Special Rapporteur, supra note 5, at 1. 
 136. Id. at 1, 6–7 (emphasis added). 
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information, is also apparent throughout the Report.  In fact, the 
importance to promote, or protect, the “free flow of information” is 
discussed several times in the Report.137  And, in the Report’s 
recommendations, the Special Rapporteur held that: 
[T]here should be as little restriction as possible to the 
flow of information via the Internet, except in few, 
exceptional, and limited circumstances prescribed by 
international human rights law.  He also stresses that the 
full guarantee of the right to freedom of expression must 
be the norm, and any limitation considered as an 
exception, and that this principle should never be 
reversed.  Against this backdrop, the Special Rapporteur 
recommends the steps set out below.138 
This is a fairly clear and unmistakable affirmation of the “free flow 
of information” principle, which arises from Article 19(2)’s 
language, and its history and origins in the Free Flow of 
Information Paradigm.139  
And the third Free Flow of Information Paradigm principle, 
which recognized the importance of free and accessible mass 
media to freedom of expression and information, is not only 
explicitly and implicitly invoked over and over again in the Report, 
it is reflected by the central finding of the Report itself: that the 
Internet is essential to Article 19’s right of expression and the right 
to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas.  For example, 
early on, the Special Rapporteur recognizes the power of the 
Internet in contemporary society: 
The Special Rapporteur believes that the Internet is one 
of the most powerful instruments of the 21st century for 
increasing transparency in the conduct of the powerful, 
access to information, and for facilitating active citizen 
participation in building democratic societies.  Indeed, 
the recent wave of demonstrations in countries across the 
Middle East and North African region has shown the key 
role that the Internet can play in mobilizing the 
population to call for justice, equality, accountability and 
better respect for human rights.  As such, facilitating 
access to the Internet for all individuals, with as little 
restriction to online content as possible, should be a 
 
 137. Id. at 4, 13, 15, 19, 22.  
 138. Id. at 19.  
 139. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 48, at 
art. 19(2). 
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priority for all States.140 
From there, the Report goes on to link the Internet’s powerful 
impact to the importance of freedom of expression and the 
exchange of ideas: 
Very few if any developments in information technologies 
have had such a revolutionary effect as the creation of the 
Internet.  Unlike any other medium of communication, 
such as radio, television and printed publications based 
on one-way transmission of information, the Internet 
represents a significant leap forward as an interactive 
medium . . . . Such platforms are particularly valuable in 
countries where there is no independent media, as they 
enable individuals to share critical views and to find 
objective information.  Furthermore, producers of 
traditional media can also use the Internet to greatly 
expand their audiences at nominal cost.  More generally, 
by enabling individuals to exchange information and 
ideas instantaneously and inexpensively across national 
borders, the Internet allows access to information and 
knowledge that was previously unattainable.  This, in turn, 
contributes to the discovery of the truth and progress of 
society as a whole.141 
After noting the importance of the Internet in its role as a medium 
of ideas and information, the Special Rapporteur finds that the 
Internet has become a “key means” for people to “exercise their 
right to freedom of opinion and expression, as guaranteed by 
[A]rticle 19 . . . .”142  This, I would argue, constitutes a rather clear 
affirmation, or reflection, of this third central tenet of the Free 
Flow of Information Paradigm.  All of the paradigm’s principles are 
reflected in the Report, in many of its findings. 
A final observation should be made.  Earlier, I talked about 
Internet rights in both negative and positive terms; the former 
concerned restricting state intervention on access rights, while the 
positive component concerned positive obligations the state might 
have to actively provide people with the means to access the 
Internet.  That is, where people might not have Internet access, the 
state would have to take steps to provide the infrastructure for that 
connectivity.  The Report (as I noted much earlier) talks primarily 
about Internet access rights in negative terms; about the many ways 
that states are restricting people’s access to the Internet, and its 
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 141. Id. at 6–7  
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content, by way of filtering, censoring, criminalizing expression, 
intermediary liability, and cyber-attacks.143  The Report does talk 
somewhat about the physical infrastructure needed for Internet 
access, and state obligations surrounding it, but its 
recommendations on these points amount mainly to a “call” for 
states to develop strategies to build Internet infrastructure, and 
more wealthy companies to “honour” their commitment to help 
underdeveloped countries to do so.144  But, there are only a 
handful of recommendations on these points, compared to the 
lengthy ones on dealing with state restrictions on Internet access 
and its content.145 
Interestingly, the Free Flow of Information Paradigm, as 
noted, was similarly negative in orientation; it was concerned mainly 
with promoting the unrestricted flow of information and ideas 
internationally and across borders, and limiting state restrictions on 
media and mediums.  Other than recognizing the importance of 
communication mediums to freedom of information and 
expression, it never resolutely imposed positive state obligations to 
provide people with the means or mediums to communicate.  In 
other words, the general orientation of the Free Flow of 
Information Paradigm is also reflected in the overall orientation of 
the Report, articulating a conception of Internet access rights that 
is mainly negative in application and focus. 
V. INTERNET RIGHTS: FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In the end, this paradigm of thought on information law and 
principles, codified in Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, constitutes the 
intellectual origins and the broader historical context of the 
concept of rights set out by the Report.  Without this context, it is 
impossible to understand where these ideas came from, and, 
arguably, where ideas about Internet or information and 
communication rights will ultimately go in the years ahead.  In this 
section, I discuss some potential future directions in light of this 
groundbreaking Report.  What are some of its implications? 
First, the Report will likely have some impact in national legal 
jurisdictions around the world, where courts may adopt its 
 
 143. See id. at 1. 
 144. Id. at 22. 
 145. Compare id. at 9–16 (discussing at length the “[r]estriction of content on 
the Internet,” which includes arbitrary blocking and filtering, criminalization of 
legitimate expression, intermediary liability, and cyber-attacks), with id. at 16–19 
(discussing briefly access to “necessary infrastructure”). 
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reasoning when making legal rulings about people’s access to the 
Internet, and government regulation of access and content.  Of 
course, how much influence will depend upon the legal systems in 
question, and the legal culture those systems foster, but a clear 
declaration from a high profile U.N. adjudicative official like the 
Special Rapporteur will not go unnoticed, particularly given the 
global attention it received when the Report was released. 
Second, the Report may also have a political impact.  I noted 
earlier that the Report mainly discussed restrictions on Internet 
access rights; in making the finding of Internet access as a 
fundamental human right, the Report may still push governments 
to take positive steps to provide broader and better Internet access 
for populations.  Indeed, there are real world legislative models in 
countries like Finland and Estonia, who are leading the way with 
statutory schemes guaranteeing citizen access to the Internet.  The 
Report may, ultimately, foster public support for similar legislation 
in other jurisdictions. 
Finally, given that the notion of Internet access rights set out 
in the Report is grounded in a longer, and continually evolving 
movement of ideas about information flow and communication 
rights, it is unlikely that this is a passing legal phase or fad; and the 
scope and basis for such rights claims will likely only broaden and 
strengthen with time, particularly as Internet use is integrated more 
and more in the daily lives of people around the world.  And, 
indeed, this is linked to my purpose in undertaking this 
exploration.  I have attempted to show, first and foremost, that the 
Report was not a surprising anomaly, nor did its ideas arise out of a 
vacuum; but that they arise, and can only be understood, within a 
broader historical and legal context.  I hope that I have persuaded, 
or at least provided a persuasive foundation, for further study of 
these ideas and their origins. 
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